Canada’s forthcoming nuclear expansion project will rely on foreign suppliers, including the United States, for the enrichment and fabrication of fuel. This shift contrasts with the historical Candu reactor system, which utilized a predominantly domestic nuclear supply chain thanks to Canada’s significant uranium production.
Ontario has commenced construction on the initial BWRX-300 small modular reactor (SMR) out of four planned units at the Darlington New Nuclear Project in Clarington, Ont. These American-Japanese-designed light water reactors use low-enriched uranium, diverging from Canada’s traditional use of domestically produced natural uranium in Candu reactors.
Ontario Power Generation (OPG) anticipates connecting the first BWRX-300 unit to the grid at Darlington by the end of 2030, with the remaining three expected to follow in the mid-2030s. Cameco, a Saskatchewan-based uranium mining and fuel company, will supply uranium ore from Saskatchewan for conversion in Port Hope, Ont., before enrichment in the United States. Enriched uranium suppliers also include France’s Orano and Britain’s Urenco, while an American firm will handle the fabrication of the fuel assemblies.
This strategic shift has been criticized by experts for deviating from the original intent of the Candu program, which aimed to establish a self-reliant Canadian fuel supply chain. The reliance on foreign sources for enriched uranium raises concerns about energy sovereignty and potential geopolitical vulnerabilities.
Ontario’s decision to opt for a foreign reactor, the BWRX-300, was driven by the lack of a viable Canadian alternative capable of meeting electricity generation demands at scale. While Canada is developing the Candu Monark reactor domestically, it does not align with Ontario’s SMR project requirements.
Although multiple enrichment suppliers mitigate supply risks, the continued dependence on foreign sources poses long-term challenges. Establishing a domestic uranium enrichment industry would be a solution to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers, but it presents significant financial and regulatory hurdles.
In conclusion, while the shift to foreign suppliers for nuclear fuel enriches and fabrications presents certain advantages, it also exposes Canada to potential risks and challenges in safeguarding its energy sovereignty and security.
