Canada, known for opposing the 2003 Iraq war, was getting ready to support the U.S.-led invasion by deploying naval ships if the UN Security Council approved, as per cabinet records. The minutes from the final cabinet meetings before the invasion indicated the government was still considering the UN’s potential sanction of military action and how it impacted ministers during discussions about life and death.
The U.S. initiated the invasion with the aim of disarming Saddam Hussein of alleged weapons of mass destruction that were never found. President George W. Bush’s administration framed the conflict as part of the broader war on terror following the September 11 attacks. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien formally declared in the House of Commons on March 17, 2003, that Canada would not join the U.S.-led “coalition of the willing” in Iraq just days before the invasion commenced.
The U.S. withdrew a resolution from the Security Council on the same day that was expected to authorize military action after facing potential defeat. Access to information revealed minutes from the final cabinet meeting held on February 25, 2003, before Chrétien’s announcement, indicating Canada’s readiness for potential military involvement.
Then Minister of National Defence John McCallum mentioned in the meeting that Canada couldn’t provide ground support due to commitments in Afghanistan if the resolution passed, but suggested the deployment of warships. Retired General Raymond Henault confirmed that the documents aligned with what he communicated to the government about the Canadian Armed Forces’ possible contributions to the Iraq war.
Canada had ships in the Persian Gulf at that time engaged in counterterrorism and counter-smuggling operations. Discussions between U.S. and Canadian officials mentioned in a leaked U.S. diplomatic memo proposed utilizing these ships in support of the invasion if approved by the UN.
Redeploying the ships implied their involvement in naval combat operations supporting the invasion of Iraq, including ships with patrol aircraft like helicopters and potential engagement of Canadian special forces. Chrétien’s office did not respond to inquiries for an interview about his decision on the matter.
The decision to stay out of the war was seen as a demonstration of Canada’s sovereignty at the time. While support for Chrétien’s choice was evident in the cabinet, concerns arose about potential repercussions on U.S.-Canada relations.
Despite not being a member of the Security Council, Canada aimed to assist in resolving the impasse during the council’s deliberations. Ministers expressed support for disarmament in Iraq and underscored the importance of principled leadership post-conflict and in the fight against terrorism.
The war in Iraq had long-term implications, creating a vacuum that led to ISIS’s rise as a significant threat. Canadian intelligence assessments before the invasion were deemed accurate, and concerns were raised about the potential increase in terrorism due to the conflict.
Discussions among ministers turned philosophical, delving into the justifications for war and the implications of taking lives. The emotions and gravity of the decision-making process were highlighted, reflecting the heavy toll of potential Canadian involvement in the conflict over 20 years ago.
